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Integration Reclaimed: A Review of Gary Peller’s
Critical Race Consciousness
MICHELLE ADAMS
Integration occupies a contested and often paradoxical place in legal
and public policy scholarship and the American imagination. Today, more
Americans are committed to integration than ever before. Yet this
attachment to integration is hardly robust. There is a widespread
perception that integration has failed. A vanishingly small percentage of
social and economic resources are spent on integration. At the same time,
some progressives and those who would otherwise consider themselves on
the “left” criticize integration as insufficiently attentive to economic
equality and dismissive of black identity and culture. Scholars from across
the political spectrum have sought to explain this disconnect and to assess
the possibilities of integration as a political program, moral ideal, and
social agenda.
In his recent book, Critical Race Consciousness: Reconsidering
American Ideologies of Racial Justice, Professor Gary Peller joins this
robust and ongoing conversation. Peller’s central claim is not that
integration has had too little influence over the shape of racial equality
and social policy, but that it has had too much. One must him credit for
intervening in this important discussion. Peller’s intervention is to argue
for a muscular, nuanced, and sophisticated understanding of black
nationalism as it posed an ideological alternative to integration. His
central achievement is to add value to the scholarly discussion about a
critical issue: What is the meaning of racial justice, and did (and does)
integration help us achieve it?
Ultimately, however, Peller’s argument was not convincing. His
capture of integration as having footing solely in individualistic race
neutrality is problematic for at least three reasons. First, it misses the
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structural dimensions of the integration ideology. Instead, integration is
actually quite radical because of its laser-like focus on racial segregation,
which structures, maintains, and perpetuates inequality across virtually
every indicia of social, political, educational, and economic well-being.
Second, it misconstrues the extent to which integration has been accepted
as a goal in the United States. Third, it mischaracterizes the extent to
which integration, as distinguished from an ideology of individualistic race
neutrality, has led to current views of equal protection law. In this Book
Review, I support my critique of Critical Race Consciousness, and my
affirmative claim about the virtues of integration by referencing history,
legal analysis, and current debates about how best to achieve racial
equality.
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Integration Reclaimed: A Review of Gary Peller’s
Critical Race Consciousness
MICHELLE ADAMS∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Integration occupies a contested and often paradoxical place in legal
and public policy scholarship and the American imagination. It often is
characterized as “[t]he nation’s official civil rights policy”1 and as the
“ultimate definition of racial justice.”2 Most whites (and blacks) embrace
the principle of racial equality and integration.3 Thus, the “norm holds that
black Americans deserve the same treatment as whites, and in addition,
that racial integration in all public spheres of life is a desirable goal.”4
Today, more Americans are committed to integration than at any time in
the past.5
Yet, this attachment to integration is hardly robust. While blacks
support integration, they do not “crave” it.6 There is a widespread
perception that integration has “failed.”7 A vanishingly small percentage
of social and economic (including federal budgetary) resources are spent

∗

Professor of Law and Co-Director, Floersheimer Center for Constitutional Democracy,
Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School. This Book Review was made possible by the generous financial
support of the Cardozo Law School Summer Research Stipend Program. I would like to thank Rachel
Godsil, Tristin Green, Thomas Healy, Randall Kennedy, Robin Lenhardt, Melissa Murray, Laura
Nelsen, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Alex Reinert, Zelma Rios, Kate Shaw, Catherine Smith, and Peggy
Smith for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this Book Review. Finally, I extend thanks to
Martina Davis, Kyle Epstein, and Jason Starr for outstanding research assistance.
1
ROY L. BROOKS, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION?: A STRATEGY FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 1
(1996).
2
GARY PELLER, CRITICAL RACE CONSCIOUSNESS: RECONSIDERING AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES OF
RACIAL JUSTICE, at xiv (2011).
3
Lawrence D. Bobo & Camille Z. Charles, Race in the American Mind: From the Moynihan
Report to the Obama Candidacy, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 243, 245 (2009).
4
HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL ATTITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS
311–12 (1997).
5
SHERYLL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HOW RACE AND CLASS ARE
UNDERMINING THE AMERICAN DREAM 11–12 (2004).
6
Id. at xii.
7
See, e.g., BROOKS, supra note 1, at 1 (“For all of its moral and political appeal, however, racial
integration has been an unsuccessful civil rights strategy.”); Eric Foner & Randall Kennedy,
Reclaiming Integration, NATION, Dec. 14, 1998, at 11, 11 (“Books continue to appear with the word
[integration] in their titles, but most seem resigned to integration’s failure, treating it as an ongoing
‘ordeal’ or seeking to allocate blame for the nation’s departure from integrationist principles.”).
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on integration, and the Obama Administration’s record on integration has
been mixed.9 Conservatives recently have urged the repeal of laws that
provide funding to integrate public schools and have provided significant
financial support to elect school board members who oppose integration.10
At the same time, some progressives and those who would otherwise
consider themselves on the “left” criticize integration as insufficiently
attentive to economic equality and dismissive of black identity and

8
Integration is the public policy solution that dare not speak its name. See Bob Herbert, Op-Ed.,
Separate and Unequal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 2011, at A27 (arguing that while integration is “[o]ne of
the most powerful tools for improving the educational achievement of black and Hispanic public school
students . . . . [i]t has become a political no-no”); see also NAT’L COALITION ON SCH. DIVERSITY,
FEDERAL SUPPORT FOR SCHOOL INTEGRATION: A STATUS REPORT 1 (2012), available at
http://www.school-diversity.org/pdf/DiversityIssueBriefNo4.pdf (reporting that while “[t]he Secretary
of Education has expressed strong support for school diversity and reduction of racial isolation in
speeches . . . . support for school integration is not yet reflected in the requirements and point systems
of many key [departmental] competitive grant programs, where it might make the most difference”);
James E. Ryan, The Supreme Court and Voluntary Integration, 121 HARV. L. REV. 131, 142 (2007)
(“[I]ntegration has not been seriously pursued in most [public school] districts for over two decades.”);
Steve Bogira, Separate, Unequal, and Ignored, CHI. READER (Feb. 10, 2011),
http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/chicago-politics-segregation-african-american-black-whitehispanic-latino-population-census-community/Content?oid=3221712 (stating that segregation has
“largely disappeared from the nation’s agenda”).
9
See Richard Kahlenberg, Does Obama Believe in School Integration?, TAKING NOTE (Nov. 17,
2009), http://takingnote.tcf.org/2009/11/does-obama-believe-in-school-integration.html (asserting that
after ten months in office, the Obama Administration had not shown a significant commitment to
school integration); When Will the Government Actually Fight “The Battle of Westchester?,” ANTIDISCRIMINATION CTR. (May 15, 2012), http://www.antibiaslaw.com/westchester-false-claimscase/when-will-government-actually-fight-battle-westchester (reporting on a recent federal district
court decision finding Westchester County in breach of a historic consent decree that requires it to end
residential segregation and existing patterns of racial exclusion throughout the county, and asserting
that “the federal government is still failing to treat the consent decree as the binding federal court order
that it is, and has yet to hold Westchester to account for its continuing violations of each and all of its
consent decree obligations”); see also NAT’L COALITION ON SCH. DIVERSITY, supra note 8, at 1
(stating that the Secretary of Education’s support for diversity in schools has not yet been reflected in
competitive grant programs). On the other hand, the Obama Administration has issued important new
guidance on integration to local school districts. This new guidance embraces diversity and indicates
that school districts may use race in student assignment plans in order to promote diversity. U.S. Dep’t
of Educ. & U.S. Dep’t of Just., Guidance on the Voluntary Use of Race to Achieve Diversity and Avoid
Racial
Isolation
in
Elementary
and
Secondary
Schools,
ED.GOV,
http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/guidance-ese-201111.html (last updated Jan. 3, 2012).
10
See Minnesota Senate Republican: Integration ‘Destroyed’ Minneapolis, WASH. INDEP.
(Apr. 1, 2011),
http://washingtonindependent.com/107369/minnesota-senate-republican-integration%E2%80%98destroyed%E2%80%99-minneapolis (reporting “a move by Minnesota Republicans to
repeal school integration laws” that “would take funding from integration and desegregation
programs . . . and shift them to statewide programs for literacy”); see also Jane Mayer, State for Sale,
NEW YORKER, Oct. 10, 2011, at 90 (reporting that “conservative board members, elected [to the Wake
County School board] with the support of [a conservative multimillionaire] and Tea Party activists,
overturned a program that used busing to achieve economic diversity in schools—a program that the
Washington Post had called ‘one of the nation’s most celebrated integration efforts’”).

2013]

INTEGRATION RECLAIMED

731

11

culture.
Given integration’s prominence as the ideological centerpiece of the
Civil Rights Movement, these crosscutting tensions prompted scholars and
commentators to explain the disconnect and to assess the possibilities of
integration as “a political program, moral ideal and social agenda.”12 Some
scholars have argued that integration holds significant transformative
potential.13 They assert that integration should be resurrected and again
occupy the center of any meaningful program for racial and social justice.14
Other scholars have suggested that because racial integration “is not the
right answer for most African Americans,”15 that a policy of limited
separation is preferable.16
In his recent book, Critical Race Consciousness: Reconsidering
American Ideologies of Racial Justice, Professor Gary Peller joins this
robust and ongoing conversation about integration and its role in
facilitating racial equality. Peller’s central claim is not that integration has
had too little influence over the shape of racial equality and social policy,
but that it has had too much.17 Thus, Peller asserts that in the ideological
struggle between black nationalists and integrationists over the meaning of
racial justice, victory should have gone to the nationalists—not the
integrationists.18 From there, the die was cast. For Peller, there is no need
to “reclaim” integration, because the ideology of “integrationism” that
emerged from this conflict was fatally flawed from the start.19
Integrationism was conservative, apologetic, and unduly focused on the

11
See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, THE IMPERATIVE OF INTEGRATION 1 (2010) (“One might have
expected civil rights activists to press harder for integration. But by the late 1960s, left political
movements were shifting priorities from ‘redistribution’ to ‘recognition’—from socioeconomic
equality to equality of respect and esteem for identities and cultures.”); Foner & Kennedy, supra note 7,
at 11 (“Many leftists feel that as a political goal, integration fails to address deeply rooted economic
inequalities. Many African-Americans criticize it for implying the dismantling of a distinctive black
culture and identity.”).
12
Foner & Kennedy, supra note 7, at 11.
13
See Eric Foner, Editorial, The Great Divide, NATION, Oct. 30, 1995, at 488 (arguing that
“integration has meant not the absorption of blacks into the pre-existing white social order but the
transformation of American society so as to give real meaning to the principle of equality”).
14
See ANDERSON, supra note 11, at 1 (“This book aims to resurrect the ideal of integration from
the grave of the Civil Rights Movement.”); Foner, supra note 13, at 488 (“The time has come to
reintroduce integration into our political vocabulary . . . .”).
15
BROOKS, supra note 1, at 104.
16
See id. at 199 (defining “[l]imited separation” as “any racial or gender classification that
promotes individual opportunity but that does not unnecessarily subordinate or trammel the interests of
individuals inside or outside the group”).
17
See PELLER, supra note 2, at xvi (asserting that the predominance of integrationism in the
1960s and 1970s ultimately stifled reform and legitimated already existing social practices).
18
Id. at xii.
19
Id. at xiv–xv.
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narrow aim of overcoming prejudice and discrimination. The ideology of
integrationism was inconsistent with meaningful reform.21
Thus, in Peller’s analysis, the integrationists’ triumph set the stage for
the marginalization of black nationalism; helped to “legitimate and
perpetuate the existing racial distribution of power and prestige;”22
facilitated conservatives’ ability to co-opt and ultimately undermine
progressive racial reforms;23 undermined the Court’s ability to adopt a de
facto, rather than de jure, standard for proving violations of the Equal
Protection Clause; and finally made it more difficult for progressive whites
and others to critique more recent neo-black nationalist discourse that
undermines racial equality.24
One must give Professor Peller credit for intervening in this important
discussion. Professor Peller’s project takes black nationalism seriously as
an ideological and political worldview. He wants to resuscitate black
nationalism from the one-dimensional perspective from which it is often
viewed.25 Consequently, Professor Peller’s intervention is to argue for a
muscular, nuanced, and sophisticated understanding of black nationalism
as it posed an ideological alternative to integration.26 Critical Race
Consciousness is useful because it distills two iconic approaches to
achieving racial justice and shows how black nationalism provided a thick,
substantive critique of integration.27 The book succeeds in showing how
these two philosophies were in continual dialogue during the height of the
Civil Rights Movement.
But ultimately, Professor Peller’s argument is not convincing. Critical
Race Consciousness woefully underestimates integration and
mischaracterizes integrationism.
Peller conflates integration with
“integrationism,” and then defines integrationism as an individualistic,
race-neutral notion of antidiscrimination.28 Peller defines “integrationism”
as a set of beliefs that locates “racial oppression in the social structure of
prejudice and stereotype based on skin color and that identifies progress
with the transcendence of a racial consciousness about the world.”29
According to Peller, integrationism was concerned primarily with
20
See id. at xiv (arguing that since “integrationism” was a conservative movement, it reinforced
social and institutional norms which perpetuated white dominance rather than bringing about
meaningful reforms).
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id. at xiv–xv.
24
Id. at 113.
25
Id. at xv.
26
Id. at xii.
27
See id. at xv (stating that he will analyze black nationalism and integrationism and show that
they are not bipolar world views).
28
Id. at 4–5.
29
Id. at xii.
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eradicating racial prejudice and advancing individual equal treatment. As
part of its commitment to individual equal treatment, integrationism
privileged race neutrality, equal opportunity, and the elimination of
discrimination.31 From Peller’s perspective, integrationism is deeply
problematic because it converts the complex practice of social
subordination into a narrow problem of discrimination.32 At the same time,
integrationism’s focus on equal treatment and the evils of racial
discrimination made it possible to equate black racism with white racism.33
What Peller misses is that integration neither was nor should be seen
simply as an exercise in attempting to reform whites’ prejudicial views. I
have argued that integration is actually quite radical because of its laserlike focus on racial segregation, which “structures, maintains, and
perpetuates inequality across virtually every indicia of social, political,
educational and economic wellbeing.”34 Nor is integration necessarily in
tension with black culture and identity formation.35 Thus, I offered the
concept of “radical integration,” where the goal of integration is to ensure
that “previously separate environment[s] actually facilitate instrumental
equality for the purposes of facilitating black empowerment.”36 Radical
integration encompasses a strong structural component and takes black
identity formation within newly integrated environments seriously.
Properly understood, integration is a tool for undermining established
power structures. Integrationists attacked segregation because they
understood segregation for what it was: a systematic regime structured to
disenfranchise and disinvest in the black community and dishonor and
stigmatize individual African Americans.37 Accordingly, much of the
integrationist approach was an attempt to gain access to white-dominated
resources. The integrationist approach, like the nationalist approach, was
oriented toward redressing a power imbalance.38 Neither approach was
perfect, but it goes too far to assume that if nationalism had achieved
30

Id. at 4.
Id. at 4–6.
32
Id. at 6–7.
33
See id. at 7 (“[W]ithin the integrationist ideology, a Black person who stereotypes whites is
racist in the same way as a white person who harbors prejudice against Blacks. And Blacks who
discriminate against whites are guilty of the same kind of racism as whites who discriminate against
Blacks. Anyone can engage in racism because we can identify racism from a vantage point of race
neutrality, of not making someone’s race count for anything. The symmetry of the integrationist
picture is rooted in the idea that racism consists of possessing a race consciousness about the world, in
thinking that race should make a difference in social relations.”).
34
Michelle Adams, Radical Integration, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 261, 275 (2006).
35
See id. at 297–311 (arguing that racial identity can be formed in a variety of contexts, not just in
geographically black communities; that black individuals can construct post segregation identities; and
that narrow notions of “authentic” black identity are incorrect).
36
Id. at 274.
37
PELLER, supra note 2, at 4.
38
Id. at 7.
31

734

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:725

sustained dominance in the black community, everything, including the
trajectory of equal protection doctrine after the Brown v. Board of
Education39 decision, would have been different.
Critical Race Consciousness is not simply a work of social or political
history of how black power adherents responded to calls for school
integration in 1967. Instead, Critical Race Consciousness makes a
normative argument about how one should think about integration as a
goal.40 Peller argues that integration as a goal was flawed from the start
because it was bound up with a fundamental commitment to race neutrality
that focused on correcting whites’ cognitive error and universalism.41
Peller’s claims tap into the view that integration served the narrow interests
of racially insecure black folk who sought a form of race reform that
corresponded with white interests. A common view of integration—which
Critical Race Consciousness supports and advances—is that integration
has been accommodationist and lacking in any fundamental structural
critique of the vast power imbalances between blacks and whites.42 In this
Book Review, I reclaim integration from Peller’s integrationism and show
how integration has important structural roots and potential for achieving
racial justice. The review is organized in two parts.
In Part II, I describe Professor Peller’s definition of “integrationism,”
his critique of integrationism, and his vision of modern black nationalism.
In Peller’s view, integrationism triumphantly emerged from the ideological
confrontation between integrationists and black nationalists in the 1960s
For Peller, the wrong ideology triumphed because
and 1970s.43
integrationism mistakes the practice of social domination for discrete
instances of cognitive irrationality.44 At the same time, integrationism
rejects race consciousness.45 Thus, integrationism could never provide a
sustained critique of (or a serious solution for) the massive power
imbalance between blacks and whites. Peller asserts that, on the other
hand, modern black nationalism was poised to “revitalize and transform
the struggle against racial oppression.”46 But black nationalism’s potential
39

349 U.S. 294 (1955).
Cf. PELLER, supra note 2, at xi–xii (critiquing the fact that integrationist ideology has played a
limiting role in race reform over the last several decades).
41
See id. at 8 (arguing that this movement has become “the struggle against ‘race,’ thus
appear[ing] natural and inevitable . . . and simply another part of the teleological progression toward
the liberation of social life”).
42
See id. at 3 (describing integrationism as a social resistance movement of hundreds of
thousands of people from different cities who, under the same banner, employed mass protests,
economic boycotts, civil disobedience, sit-ins, and strikes).
43
Id. at xii.
44
Id. at 6–7.
45
See id. at 4 (explaining the ideal was to “transcend stereotypes in favor of treating people as
individuals, free from racial-group identification”).
46
Id. at xiv.
40
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was never realized because a coalition of liberal whites and black
moderates joined forces to “equate Black nationalists with white
supremacists,” bringing forth the consensus view of black nationalism.47
In Part III, I present my critique. I argue that Professor Peller has
improperly converted integration into “integrationism,” which he
associates with an individualistic, race-neutral notion of antidiscrimination.
I contest Peller’s definition of integrationism then and now, and I explain
why his bending of integration to race neutrality is problematic. As I
explain in Part III.A, integration, when properly understood, has radical
transformative potential. In this Part, I show how prominent proponents of
integration, as well as many of the architects of the litigation that
culminated in Brown v. Board of Education, asserted a structural view of
integration. They attacked segregation and favored integration because
they believed it was the best way to secure equal opportunity and full
citizenship for all black people.48 Legal and social science research and
literature support the view that segregation is an exceedingly powerful
form of exclusion, which facilitates systematic disinvestment and retreat
from black communities and resource hoarding in white communities.
Because of integration’s “laser-like” focus on the harms associated with
racial segregation, it is incorrect to characterize integration as being
premised primarily on race neutrality and little else, as Critical Race
Consciousness suggests.49
In Part III.A, I argue that Professor Peller’s view is problematic for
another reason: it mischaracterizes the extent to which integration has been
accepted as a goal by Americans. Peller accurately observes that our
reigning racial ideology is the commitment to individualistic raceneutrality in the provision of governmental services and functions, in
public accommodations, and in some areas of private life. This is a huge
advance over a de jure regime, but it is not integration. Peller defines
integration as integrationism and then conflates integrationism with our
society’s commitment to individualistic race-neutrality.50 The better
definition of integration is as a set of beliefs that recognizes the limitations
of our society’s equality norm (a commitment to enforcing race-neutral,
antidiscrimination in governmental decision-making), but presses for the
fullest possible enforcement of that norm notwithstanding its inherent
limitations. From this perspective, integrationists’ demands are clearly
structural. Integrationists insist that our race-neutral antidiscrimination

47

Id.
PELLER, supra note 2, at 5.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 4.
48
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regime breaks down “barriers to entry” to formerly closed white spaces.51
In Part III.B, I argue that Professor Peller’s capture of integration as
having footing solely in individualistic race neutrality is also problematic
because it mischaracterizes the extent to which integration, as
distinguished from an ideology of individualistic race-neutrality, has led to
current views of equal protection law.
On Peller’s account,
integrationism’s rejection of race consciousness and its embrace of race
neutrality and colorblindness facilitated the Court’s narrow interpretation
of the Equal Protection Clause and its disdain for affirmative action.52 I
reach a different conclusion. I explore Keyes v. School District No. 1,
Denver, Colorado53 and Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle
School District54 and conclude that the equal protection doctrine is
malleable. The trajectory of the equal protection doctrine since the Court’s
decision in Brown v. Board of Education has had more to do with the
complex interaction of social movements, electoral results, court
appointments, and white backlash than with integrationists’ ideological
“capture” of racial discourse.
II. CRITICAL RACE CONSCIOUSNESS: THE CRITIQUE
A. Integrationism: Definition and Critique
In Radical Integration, I argued against narrowly dichotomizing
integration on the one hand and black identity and culture on the other.55
In Critical Race Consciousness, Professor Peller takes a different
approach. For Peller, “integrationism” “locates racial oppression in the
social structure of prejudice and stereotype based on skin color
and . . . identifies progress with the transcendence of racial consciousness
about the world.”56 In Peller’s view, integrationism, essentially a discourse
or set of beliefs about racial relationships, is the ideology that triumphantly
emerged from the ideological confrontation between integrationists and
black nationalists in the 1960s and 1970s.57 For Peller, that triumph
carried a high price: “[T]he dominant conception of racial justice
[integrationism] was framed to require that Black nationalism be equated
with white supremacy and that race consciousness on the part of either
whites or Blacks by marginalized as beyond the good sense of
51
See id. at xii (explaining the structural aspects of integrationism and how it seeks to forge raceneutrality).
52
See infra Part II.B (describing Peller’s view of black nationalism).
53
413 U.S. 189 (1973).
54
551 U.S. 701 (2007).
55
See Adams, supra note 34, at 267, 302 (asserting that there is a false dichotomy between
integration and black identity formation).
56
PELLER, supra note 2, at xii.
57
Id.
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‘enlightened’ American culture.”
In order to understand Peller’s vision of integrationism, it is important
to focus on Peller’s description of the structure of integrationist ideology.
The integrationist ideology forms the analytic components of
integrationism.59 As Peller describes the integrationist ideology, or vision,
racial inequality is caused by irrational thinking or prejudice, which leads
whites to believe in white supremacy and take harmful actions toward
blacks based upon those beliefs.60 For Peller’s integrationists then, the
individual, rather than the group, is the baseline unit of measurement.61
Skin color is simply a phenotype, nothing more. Consequently, whites’
discriminatory actions toward blacks are the actual manifestations of a
flawed cognitive process.62
At the core of Peller’s integrationism is the problem of discrimination,
“the disparate treatment of whites and Blacks that the irrational attribution
of difference is supposed to justify.”63 Thus, integrationists see racism as a
deviation from neutrality.64 They imagine the ideal of a race-neutral world
where discrimination on the basis of race no longer occurs because
irrational prejudice has been rooted out.65 Thus, the integrationist wants to
get beyond race, transcend it, and achieve a world where individuals are
seen as individuals, not as numbers of racially defined groups.66
Universalism, objectivity, rationalism, and a commitment to liberalism in
the classical sense are all sacrosanct.67
Peller’s integrationists are committed to a narrative of progress, where
once “we remove prejudice, reason will take its place; once we remove
discrimination, neutrality will take its place; once we remove segregation,
integration will take its place.”68 Obviously, segregation is inconsistent
with the integrationist worldview. Indeed, segregation and the Jim Crow
regime are perhaps the ultimate manifestation of whites’ distorted mental
process. From Peller’s perspective, the integrationists’ problem with
segregation is not fundamentally structural. Instead, to the integrationist,
segregation is a manifestation of the “distortion of reason through the

58

Id.
Id. at 3.
60
Id. at 4.
61
Id. at 4–5.
62
See id. (discussing how, under the integationist ideology, racism is manifested in the social
context when the consciousness distorts prejudice and that is translated into practice).
63
Id.
64
Id. at 6.
65
Id. at 4–5.
66
Id. at 5–6.
67
See id. at 6–8 (discussing the integrationist view as one that connects a commitment to
universalism, objectivity, rationalism, and a liberal society).
68
Id. at 6.
59
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prism of myth and ignorance.”
According to Peller, the central problem with integrationist ideology is
that it fundamentally misdiagnoses the nature of racism and racial
inequality. First, integrationism, as Peller understands it, mistakes the
practice of social domination for discrete instances of cognitive
In other words, integrationism mistakes power for
irrationality.70
irrationality. Second, integrationism views all forms of race consciousness
as equally pernicious.71 Thus, from the integrationist perspective, “a Black
person who stereotypes whites is racist in the same way as a white person
who harbors prejudice against Blacks.”72 That is, integrationist ideology
rejected all forms of race consciousness, including calls by blacks for
“black power” during the 1960s.
Peller argues that integrationists rejected “Black Power” because of a
fundamental disagreement about the nature of racial inequality.73 First, as
discussed above, because integrationists were ideologically committed to
race neutrality and ending racial segregation, they rejected the raceconscious nature of calls for “Black Power.”74 Second, and perhaps more
importantly, integrationists rejected black power because of a fundamental
disagreement about the nature of white supremacy and how racial equality
could be achieved. Peller argues that the “Black Power concept troubled
integrationists because it assumed that power determined the distribution
of social resources and opportunities, rather than reason or merit.”75 Thus,
the integrationists’ commitment to universalism made it impossible to
accept a black power philosophy. Integrationists and black power
advocates did not just disagree about strategy; they possessed wholly
different worldviews.76
Thus, in Peller’s view, integrationism’s focus on prejudice,
discrimination, rationality, and liberal individualism meant it could never
provide a sustained critique of (or a serious solution for) the massive power
imbalance between blacks and whites. For Peller, integrationism was
“accommodationist and conservative.”77 It was inherently conservative
since it did not demand a “radical transformation of social practices.”78 In
69

Id. at 4.
Id. at 6–7.
71
Id. at 6.
72
Id. at 7.
73
Id. at 22.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
See id. (“Through the ideological filters of integrationism, Black nationalism and white
supremacy appear essentially the same because both are rooted in race consciousness. . . .
Integrationists saw nationalists as regressive because, in the integrationist view, progress meant
transcending race as a basis of social decision-making.”).
77
Id. at 59.
78
Id. at 10.
70
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Peller’s view, integrationist practice is also too limited because it seeks
only a “change in the rules of social decision-making.”79
B. Peller’s Vision of Modern Black Nationalism
Peller views black nationalism through the lens of integration during
the 1960s and early 1970s.80 For Peller, this period was both black
nationalism’s heyday and its dénouement. It was in this period that Peller
argues:
Black nationalism had its most complete and sophisticated
theoretical development, as well as its greatest mass
appeal, . . . when it was articulated as an alternative world
view to integrationism and as part of a program of radical
social transformation by Malcolm X, Eldridge Cleaver,
Kwame Ture, Amiri Baraka, Harold Cruse, the Black
Panthers, [and others.]81
Peller describes the modern black nationalist approach as focusing on
black subordination and “the hierarchy of the white community over the
black community.”82 For black nationalists, race, rather than the
individual, is the meta-organizing principle.83 Thus, the starting point for
black nationalists was the assertion that black Americans occupy a distinct
social community.84 According to the black nationalist view, blacks are a
nation within a nation that is subjected to a form of colonial domination
within their own country.85 From this perspective, racial equality can be
achieved only by strengthening the core components of the black nation:
black churches, black schools, black businesses, black families, and black
neighborhoods.86
As Peller describes it, modern black nationalism as an ideology had
79

Id.
Id. at 20. I use the term “modern black nationalism” to mean black nationalism during the
1960s and 1970s and to distinguish it from earlier incarnations of black nationalism. Peller also
discusses the term “Black Power” as it relates to the development of modern black nationalism. Id. at
20–22. I use the term modern black nationalism to be inclusive of the phrase “black power.” See id. at
22 (declining to define the meaning of “black power” but stating that it “is clear that, for most, the
‘Black Power’ slogan represented the beginning of repudiation of integrationist/civil rights ideology in
favor of some form of nationalism”).
81
Id. at 20.
82
Id. at 37.
83
See id. at 24 (“In contrast to the integrationist premise that Blacks and whites are essentially the
same, the idea of race as the organizing basis for group consciousness asserts that Blacks and whites
are different, in the sense of coming from different communities, neighborhoods, churches, families,
histories, and of being in various ways foreigners to each other.”).
84
Id.
85
Id. at 24–25.
86
See id. at 37 (“[N]ationalists sought to strengthen and develop the institutions in the Black
community that would serve African Americans.”).
80
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achieved a level of sophistication and maturity that distinguished it from
prior iterations of nationalist belief within the black community.87 The
core components of modern black nationalism during this period were
invocation of a colonialism model to describe race relations, rejection of
accommodation with the white power structure, and a recognition that the
black community’s future laid within the geographical borders of the
United States as opposed to outside of them.88 Consequently, Peller makes
the following claim: modern black nationalists, led by Malcolm X, could
for the first time provide an essential critique that “combined militant
engagement with the white power structure with the racial solidarity and
anti-assimilationism traditionally associated with nationalism.”89
Thus, for Peller, modern black nationalism was poised to provide a
thoroughgoing and muscular critique of white hegemony. Moreover,
according to Peller, by the late 1960s, the modern black nationalists were
winning: “[A]fter decades of marginality within the African-American
community, Black nationalism achieved mass appeal and arguably
overtook integrationism as the dominant ideology of racial liberation.”90
But in Peller’s view, modern black nationalism’s potential was never
realized because a coalition of liberal whites and black moderates joined
forces to “equate Black nationalists and white supremacists” and the
consensus view of black nationalism was born.91
This struggle was not just ideological.
Peller asserts that
integrationists rejected nationalism because of the threat that it posed “to
the cultural self-identity of both the Black, middle-class moderates and
white, liberal supporters of civil rights.”92 Faced with the conflict between
an ideological and political commitment to integration on the one hand and
allegations of racial betrayal on the other, Peller asserts that the black
middle class solution was to de-racialize white space.93 Consequently,
black integrationists emphasized that the newly open institutions, spaces,
and places were race neutral, rather than subject to white racial
domination.94 Thus, for Peller, integrationists’ commitment to rationality,
individualism, and race neutrality was not just ideological; it also signaled
87

Id. at 58.
Id. at 58–59.
89
Id. at 59.
90
Id. at 54.
91
Id. at xiv.
92
Id. at 53.
93
See id. at 61 (“In the nationalist analysis, the very success of the Black middle class . . .
betrayed the aspirations of the Black community because it reflected gains granted by a white power
structure in exchange for Black administration of white interests.”).
94
See id. (“Integrationism, in the particular, universalist form it took in the 1960s, responded to
this anxiety by denying that the world to which the Black middle class aspired was racially identifiable
as a particularly white world, rather than a realm of universal, culturally neutral social practices.”).
88
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95

a deep-seated anxiety about racial self-identity.
Peller asserts that black integrationists feared race consciousness
because of insecurity about their racial self-identity.
The black
nationalists’ charges hit home for black integrationists who “worried [that]
they were assimilating to a white world” and that their presence in white
institutions accommodated rather than frustrated white interests.96 Thus,
black integrationists experienced racial anxiety. White integrationists
feared race consciousness because of insecurity about their own culture
and a deep-seated need to suppress any hint of white supremacist
ideology.97 For Peller, these twin anxieties had devastating consequences.
Integrationists “closed ranks” in rejecting black nationalism specifically
and race consciousness more generally. The result was that the
“dominance of this integrationist ideology helped establish the particular
and narrow manner in which racial power would be understood, and
thereby helped to legitimate and perpetuate the existing racial distribution
of power and prestige, even as it recommended marginal reform.”98
Thus, for Peller, integrationists and modern black nationalists were
working at cross purposes, with integrationists emphasizing the importance
of race neutrality while black nationalists stressed the importance of race
consciousness. What makes this so problematic from Peller’s perspective
is that this debate was not simply an intra-group ideological squabble.
Instead, Peller sees integrationism as driving black nationalism from
appropriate public discourse.99 Indeed, Peller asserts the integrationists’
rejection of black nationalism delegitimized black race consciousness for
all time by equating it with white supremacy. Thus for Peller:
Through the ideological filters of integrationism, Black
nationalism and white supremacy appear essentially the same
because both are rooted in race consciousness, in the idea
that race matters to one’s perception and experience of the
world. Integrationists saw nationalists as regressive because,
in the integrationist view, progress meant transcending race
as a basis of social decision-making, and in the long term,
replacing power with reason as the basis for the distribution
95
See id. at 62 (“Black integrationists gravitated toward a particularly universalist interpretation
of racial justice to help resolve anxiety that nationalists raised about their self-identity.”).
96
Id. at 53, 61–62.
97
See id. at 66–67 (“Black nationalism, particularly in the machismo and Africanist forms it took
in the late 1960s, specifically exposed the deepest inner anxieties whites as a cultural group
possessed—anxieties that white liberals and progressives have worked hard to repress.”).
98
Id. at xiv.
99
See id. at 52 (“We should understand the dominance of integrationism as at least in part an
effect, as well as a cause, of the marginalization of nationalism—as a discourse created to justify the
rejection of nationalism, as well as a discourse that simultaneously informed the way nationalism was
perceived.”).
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of resources. With the centering of integration as the
mainstream ideology of American good sense, nationalism
became marginalized as an extremist and backward
worldview, the irrational correlate in the Black community to
the never-say-die segregationists of the white community.100
In summary, Peller’s argument combines a sustained critique of
integration, while juxtaposing and dichotomizing “conservative”
integration against modern “radical” black nationalism. Integrationists
sought access to white dominated institutions. Integrationists actively
formed coalitions with progressive whites to eradicate segregation, which
necessarily domesticated integration’s racial reform project.
Integrationists’ essential unit of measurement was the individual rather
than the community. While the integrationists spoke for the black middle
classes and the black elite, the nationalists spoke for the masses.
Eradicating racial discrimination, as opposed to developing the
community, was the sine qua non of the integrationist project.
Integrationists spoke in terms of race neutrality instead of race
consciousness. The integration approach was grounded not just in
ideological commitments or pragmatism, but in deep-seated anxieties
about racial identity. For Peller, given this provenance, integration could
neither have ended American apartheid nor meaningfully transformed
racial relationships in American society. Perhaps most importantly, as I
discussed in Part II.B, Peller argues that the success of integrationism
meant equal protection law would ultimately be ineffective.
III. INTEGRATION RECLAIMED
A. Integration as a Radical Approach to Racial Inequality
Professor Peller’s view of integrationism as having footing solely in
individualistic race neutrality is problematic because it misses the
structural dimensions of integration. Instead, integration was a strategy for
structurally undermining and ultimately defeating white supremacy.
Elsewhere, I have described the concept of “radical” integration which
builds on this understanding.101 Racial integration focuses on the
importance of desegregation in order to foster blacks’ resource acquisition,
but only under conditions which foster associational equality.102 Thus,
radical integration has both a structural aspect (facilitating access to
resources) and an identity or cultural aspect (promoting the assumption that

100

Id. at 22–23.
Adams, supra note 34, at 275.
102
Id. at 272.
101
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black individuals can form meaningful identities in multiracial spaces).103
The concept of radical integration draws on the work of Dr. King and other
Civil Rights era activists.104
At the height of the Civil Rights Movement, prominent integrationists
believed that integration and the coalition building with progressive whites
that came with it was the best way to eradicate white supremacy and
improve the educational, economic, and social opportunities, not just for
middle-class blacks, but for all blacks. Take, for instance, Bayard Rustin’s
thoughtful response to the rise of the black power movement. Rustin was
one of the key architects of the Civil Rights Movement and an avowed
integrationist.105 Writing in 1966, Rustin rejected black power because he
believed black power “diverts the movement from a meaningful debate
over strategy and tactics, . . . it isolates the Negro community, and it
encourages the growth of anti-Negro forces.”106 Rustin saw the rise of
black power as an understandable, if misguided, response to the harms
associated with white supremacy.107 Indeed, Rustin explicitly rejected any
“equivalence” between black power and white racism. In his view, it was
“both absurd and immoral to equate the despairing response of the victim
with the contemptuous assertion of the oppressor.”108 Contrary to Peller’s
suggestion, integrationists like Rustin did not view all forms of race
consciousness as equally pernicious.
For Rustin, black power was born out of frustration with the pace of
change and a growing sense of nihilism in the black community.109 Rustin
argued that black power was utopian “for the by now obvious reason that
one-tenth of the population cannot accomplish much by itself.”110 Black
power was reactionary because it “would give priority to the issue of race
precisely at a time when the fundamental questions facing the Negro and
American society alike [were] economic and social.”111 Thus, Rustin
rejected the idea of black power because it lacked a structural component;
black power traded in the rhetoric of race but it lacked a realistic program
for achieving racial equality.112 Consequently, Rustin debated black power
103

Id. at 275–76.
Id. at 273–76.
105
See JOHN D’EMILIO, LOST PROPHET: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF BAYARD RUSTIN 1 (2003)
(describing Rustin as a visionary and as one of the most important figures in the Civil Rights
Movement).
106
See Bayard Rustin, “Black Power” and Coalition Politics, 42 COMMENTARY 35, 35 (1966),
available at http://www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/black-power-and-coalition-politics#.
107
Id. at 39. Professor Peller cites to Rustin twice in footnotes, but does not provide any
sustained treatment of his work. PELLER, supra note 2, at 158 n.9, 170 n.29.
108
Rustin, supra note 106, at 39.
109
Id. at 1.
110
Id. at 2.
111
Id. at 36.
112
Id. at 35.
104
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adherents on which approach would most likely yield political power,
increase economic power, reduce black unemployment, raise wages, and
improve housing conditions for blacks.113 Rustin argued for a “liberallabor-civil rights coalition which would work to make the Democratic
Party truly responsive to the aspirations of the poor, and which would
develop support [for such programs].”114 This integration approach was
confined neither to a narrow critique of whites’ cognitive processes nor a
single-minded focus on discrimination.
To be sure, integrationists sought an end to prejudice and
discrimination.
But when we look at the movement for school
desegregation we see a much more muscular vision of integration than the
characterization in Critical Race Consciousness allows. For instance,
Peller points to the conflict between integrationists and modern black
nationalists over public school integration as a key example of the
distinction between the two worldviews.115 Peller describes why modern
black nationalists thought public school integration undesirable. First,
modern black nationalists such as Malcolm X, Kwame Ture, and Charles
Hamilton argued that public school integration undermined the black
community’s control of public schools, which meant a loss of social power
and the ability of the black community to shape black children’s
education.116 Second, modern black nationalists asserted that public school
integration necessarily entailed cultural assimilation, which undermined
the integrity of black culture more generally.117
As Peller describes it, the conflict over public school integration
exemplified the difference between integrationism and black nationalism;
the integrationists focused on eradication of segregation, and the
nationalists focused on resource redistribution.118 According to Peller,
because “integrationists had no conceptual category with which to
comprehend African Americans as a separate national group, they largely
ignored the possibility of understanding racial justice in terms of transfer
of resources and power to the Black community as an entity.”119
But integration and integrationism are different. Real integration, as
opposed to integrationism, calls for structural rather than cultural
assimilation.120 Real integration seeks to allow black individuals to have
access to significant resources: “Integration values equal access to
113

Id. at 35–36.
Id.
115
PELLER, supra note 2, at 27.
116
Id.
117
Id.
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Id. at 23.
119
Id. at 28.
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john powell, Segregation and Educational Inadequacy in Twin Cities Public Schools, 17
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 337, 353 (1996).
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educational [and other social and economic] opportunity not
‘whiteness.’”121 Real integration requires “transformations of institutions,
communities and individuals.”122 Real integration “involves fundamental
change, among whites and Blacks, as people and communities.”123 Real
integration is radical in that it demands desegregation under conditions of
true equality.124
Indeed, the architects of the litigation strategy that culminated in
Brown v. Board of Education did not pursue desegregation because of
some abstract commitment to universalism or “‘neutral’ social
practices.”125 Instead, they pursued that strategy because they thought it
was the best way to secure equal educational opportunity and full
citizenship for black children under conditions of grotesque inequality.126
It is easy to forget that the architects of the school desegregation litigation
tried a black “nation-building” approach before moving on to confronting
de jure school segregation directly.127 Those architects litigated the
“equal” portion of the “separate but equal” equation as it pertained to the
enormous discrepancies in school funding for black versus white schools in
the South.128 But the effort to equalize school funding in state-mandated
racially separate schools failed.129
Those architects then moved to a direct attack on state-mandated
segregation in the public schools.130 For those architects and many others,
121

Id. at 354.
Id.
123
Id.
124
Adams, supra note 34, at 272–76.
125
PELLER, supra note 2, at 29.
126
See Robert L. Carter, The NAACP’s Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 86 MICH.
L. REV. 1083, 1095 (1988) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, THE NAACP’S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST
SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925–1950 (1987)) (asserting that the NAACP’s “real agenda” in its
litigation strategy attacking school segregation “was the removal of the basic barrier to full and equal
citizenship rights for blacks in this country”).
127
See PELLER, supra note 2, at 26–31 (exploring the competing interests of nationalists and
integrationists in school desegregation).
128
JAMES E. RYAN, FIVE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, TWO SCHOOLS, AND THE
STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA 27 (2010).
129
See id. (“More often than not, however, school officials would make a token gesture to
improve education facilities in an attempt to paper over a system that was fundamentally unequal. This
included, at times, constructing hastily built, flimsy facilities that some blacks derided as ‘Supreme
Court schools.’”); see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, For Whom Does the Bell Toll: The Bell Tolls for
Brown?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1507, 1526 (2005) (reviewing DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS:
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2004))
(asserting that an equalization strategy failed “because of costly data collecting and plaintiff buy-offs,
leaving minority and white schools still severely unequal and compelling NAACP lawyers to abandon
such strategy in part because of costs and in part because they recognized that Whites would only
protect the school system if they were in it” (footnote omitted)).
130
See RYAN, supra note 128, at 28 (“Lawyers challenging segregation became more aggressive
toward the end of the 1940s, a product of their disappointment over equalization suits and their hope
that the country might be ready for a more direct challenge to Plessy.”).
122
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the purpose of that attack was to obtain better educational opportunities for
black students.131 Consequently, the strategy underpinning the school
desegregation litigation reflected an effort to tie or link the fates of blacks
and whites, so that whites could not ignore the educational needs of black
students. It was a response to the social and political domination of blacks
by whites. As James Ryan describes it, this black-white “tying strategy”
was primarily structural in nature:
The best and perhaps only way for blacks to receive an
education equal to whites was to attend the same schools.
That way, white-dominated legislatures and school officials
could not benefit white students without also benefiting black
ones, or harm black students without also harming whites.
Desegregation, from this perspective, was not so much an
end in itself as a means to an end. It was a tying strategy,
essentially, where black students would tie their fates to
white students because, as the saying went, green follows
white.132
If the architects of the school desegregation litigation erred, it was in
underestimating “how effective white power could be in preventing full
implementation” of the Brown mandate.133 At least one of the major
architects of the school desegregation litigation believed that the basic
barrier to blacks’ full equality in American society was racial
segregation.134 As it turned out, of course, the core barrier to blacks’ full
equality was white supremacy in all of its manifestations.135
But the idea that eradicating state-mandated racial segregation could
lead to full citizenship for blacks was not far-fetched. Racial segregation
and white supremacy are inextricably linked. As John W. Cell explained
131
See Robert L. Carter, Reexamining Brown Twenty-Five Years Later: Looking Backward into
the Future, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 615, 617 (1979) (asserting that the rationale for the Brown
strategy was to obtain equal education); see also RYAN, supra note 128, at 28 (“As long as blacks were
in separate schools, many believed, they would always be shortchanged. Separate was never going to
be equal, and the equalization suits tended to confirm this impression.”); GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI
LEE, HARV. UNIV. CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, WHY SEGREGATION MATTERS: POVERTY AND
EDUCATIONAL INEQUALITY 8 (2005), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12education/integration-and-diversity/why-segregation-matters-poverty-and-educationalinequality/?searchterm=%22why%20segregation%20matters%22 (“The civil rights movement was
never about sitting next to whites, it was about equalizing opportunity.”).
132
RYAN, supra note 128, at 28; see also Jack M. Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About
Constitutional Theory, 90 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1570 (2004) (“The NAACP pushed for integration
because it sought to force white-controlled state and local governments to provide a quality education
and equal educational opportunity to black schoolchildren.”).
133
Carter, supra note 126, at 1095.
134
Id.
135
See id. (“[N]or did [the lawyers] realize at the time that the basic barrier to full equality for
blacks was not racial segregation, a symptom, but white supremacy, the disease.”).
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in his seminal work on the origins of segregation in the United States and
in South Africa, segregation was more than just a set of laws requiring the
separation of the races.136 Instead, segregation was “a conscious policy, a
process (by definition never completed), a system, and an ideology.”137
Segregation in the American South was “the highest stage[] in the
evolution of white supremacy.”138 The integrationists may have been
overly optimistic about their ability to achieve desegregation, but they had
a structural diagnosis of the problem. They understood that state-mandated
segregation rationalized and legitimated a caste system, which
simultaneously demeaned and disenfranchised blacks while facilitating the
ability of whites to monopolize political, social, and economic power.139
Indeed, voluminous legal and social science scholarship provides a
sophisticated explanation of the harms associated with segregation.140
Scholars provide a structural account of how segregation assists dominant

136
See JOHN W. CELL, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF WHITE SUPREMACY: THE ORIGINS OF
SEGREGATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE AMERICAN SOUTH 2 (1982) (describing segregation as a
policy, process, and ideology).
137
Id.
138
Id. at 3.
139
Id. at 14–20.
140
See JOHN R. LOGAN, US2010 PROJECT, WHOSE SCHOOLS ARE FAILING? 12 (2011),
http://www.s4.brown.edu/us2010/Data/Report/report5.pdf (2011) (finding large and deeply entrenched
racial disparities in schools attended by white and minority children and asserting that “it is hard to
imagine how the disadvantages in schools attended by black and Hispanic children can be redressed
unless there are major changes in the segregation of schools by race and class”); ORFIELD & LEE, supra
note 131, at 14 (“[S]egregation by race is systematically linked to other forms of segregation, including
segregation by socioeconomic status, by residential location, and increasingly by language.”); Elijah
Anderson & Douglas S. Massey, The Sociology of Race in the United States, in PROBLEM OF THE
CENTURY: RACIAL STRATIFICATION IN THE UNITED STATES 3, 10–11 (Elijah Anderson & Douglas S.
Massey eds., 2001) (referring to the social and economic effects of different forms of segregation that
persist to this day); David Card & Jesse Rothstein, Racial Segregation and the Black-White Test Score
Gap, 91 J. PUB. ECON. 2158, 2180 (2007) (“[B]oth school and neighborhood segregation have negative
effects on black relative achievement.”); David M. Cutler & Edward L. Glaeser, Are Ghettos Good or
Bad?, 112 Q.J. ECON. 827, 828 (1997) (“Using a variety of economic and social outcomes, we find
strong, consistent evidence that black outcomes are substantially worse (both in absolute terms and
relative to whites) in racially segregated cities than they are in more integrated cities.”); Douglas S.
Massey & Mary J. Fischer, The Effect of Childhood Segregation on Minority Academic Performance at
Selective Colleges, 29 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 1, 20 (2006) (“[B]lack and Latino students who grew
up under conditions of segregation were less prepared academically than those coming from majoritydominant settings.”); Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Segregation and the SAT, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 157, 191
(2006) (“[S]chool and classroom racial composition have direct effects on SAT test performance.”).
See generally DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (discussing the importance of race in American society and
the persistence of residential segregation); GARY ORFIELD ET AL., DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION:
THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (1996) (outlining the events following the
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown); SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA (James H. Carr
& Nandinee K. Kutty eds., 2008) (demonstrating how discrimination continues to produce residential
segregation, which affects access to good jobs, education, home ownership, and asset accumulation).
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groups and systematically disadvantages others.
This literature
articulates a vision of integration that does, in fact, seek to radically
transform social practices.142 From this perspective, the appropriate frame
for understanding racial inequality is inclusion and exclusion, rather than
race consciousness per se. Segregation is a very powerful form of
exclusion that allows the dominant group to hoard valuable social,
economic, and political resources while systematically disinvesting and
disassociating from the non-dominant group. On this view, integration
calls for inclusion into white-dominated space in order to gain access to the
valuable assets associated with that group.143 Consequently, this view of
integration is race conscious in that it has a structural critique of the power
relationships of racially-defined groups.
For instance, Douglas Massey explains how spatial boundaries such as
residential segregation, whether de jure or de facto, enhance the social
process of stratification.144 According to Massey, stratification is the social
process wherein:
[I]ndividuals form categorical mental representations of ingroups and out-groups through framing; translate these
141
See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY, CATEGORICALLY UNEQUAL: THE AMERICAN STRATIFICATION
SYSTEM 18–19 (2007) (describing the role that spatial segregation plays in maintaining categorical
inequality and stratification); Adams, supra note 34, at 278–85 (exploring how residential segregation
structures racial inequality across a variety of domains); john a. powell & Jason Reece, The Future of
Fair Housing and Fair Credit: From Crisis to Opportunity, 57 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 209, 212 (2009)
(“We find many of the conditions that perpetuate and maintain segregation from opportunity, including
credit, not just in the conscious animus of individuals, but deeply embedded in our institutional
practices as well as our unconscious attitudes.”).
142
See, e.g., Roslyn Arlin Mickelson & Martha Bottia, Integrated Education and Mathematics
Outcomes: A Synthesis of Social Science Research, 88 N.C. L. REV. 993, 1042–43 (2010) (finding that
“for the vast majority of mathematics learners, integrated schools could be added to the list of ‘what
works’” in education); Derek W. Black, Middle-Income Peers as Educational Resources and the
Constitutional Right to Equal Access, 53 B.C. L. REV. 373, 376 (2012) (articulating “a constitutional
right to equal access to middle-income peers that operates most directly at the school district level”);
Robert A. Garda, Jr., The White Interest in School Integration, 63 FLA. L. REV. 599, 603 (2011)
(explaining the benefits of racial diversity to white parents and arguing that “[w]hite children’s future
careers and earnings hinge on educating them in diverse classrooms today”).
143
See Douglas S. Massey, Why Housing Segregation Still Matters, 3 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 97,
107 (2006) (linking residential integration with access to social resources). As Massey argues:

[T]he residential integration of most ethnic groups has been achieved as a byproduct of broader processes of socioeconomic attainment, not because group
members sought to live among native whites per se. The desire for integration is
only one of a larger set of motivations, and not necessarily the most important.
Some minorities may even be antagonistic to the idea of integration, but for spatial
assimilation to occur, they need only to be willing to put up with integration in order
to gain access to socioeconomic resources that are more abundant in areas where
white families predominate.
Id.
144
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representations into social categories through boundary work;
and then establish institutional structures for exploitation and
opportunity hoarding that correspond to categorical
boundaries, thereby generating unequal access to resources
such as financial capital, human capital, social capital, and
cultural capital.145
The stratification process structures the power relationships between ingroup and out-group members. And indeed, race is a form of social
stratification.146 Stratification is most salient when social, cultural,
economic, and spatial boundaries are consolidated.147 Conversely, when
in-groups and out-groups are spatially integrated, stratification and
strategic disinvestment become more difficult.148
But beyond recognizing how segregation facilitates stratification,
integrationists have also recognized how whiteness itself is a tool of
exclusion. As john powell and Caitlin Watt have explained, the concept of
whiteness has morphed and shape-shifted since the fall of Jim Crow.149
They argue that the concept of whiteness now signifies “a system of
privilege and exclusion related to non-whites.”150 That is, whiteness is not
a phenotype, but rather is “functionally defined . . . as the right to exclude
and dominate others.”151 Watt and powell do not ascribe bad acts or antiblack animus to all white people. Their view is exactly the opposite. It is
that race is inherent within the structure of American social, political, and
economic arrangements.152 Thus, individual animus is not necessary to
perpetuate a discriminatory system.153 But systematic exclusion is
necessary.154 And these imbedded structures create what white and black

145

Id. at 18.
Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the
Age of Obama, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1023, 1027 (2010).
147
See MASSEY, supra note 141, at 19 (“[W]hen social parameters are consolidated—when social,
economic, and spatial characteristics correlate strongly with one another—the process of stratification
become sharper and more acute.”).
148
Id. This is why “whenever the powerful have sought to stigmatize and subordinate a particular
social group, they have endeavored to confine its members to specific neighborhoods by law, edict, or
practice.” Id.
149
See john a. powell & Caitlin Watt, Negotiating the New Racial & Political Environment, 11
J.L. SOC’Y 31, 38–40 (2009) (“Whiteness has morphed . . . . White is now the inward, private, and
isolated individual.”).
150
Id. at 34.
151
Id. at 45.
152
Id. at 57.
153
See id. at 47, 58 (suggesting that while individual animus is a factor, there are other extrinsic
influences to a discriminatory system).
154
See id. at 44 (“Whiteness was created as an exclusionary space.”).
146
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mean.
This view of whiteness as exclusion takes us far beyond a static
colonial contest between the black nation and the white nation.
Professor Peller’s capture of integration as having footing solely in
individualistic race-neutrality is problematic for yet another reason: it
mischaracterizes the extent to which integration has been accepted as a
goal. As a country, we are committed to individualistic race-neutrality in
the provision of governmental services and functions, in public
accommodations, and in some areas of private life.156 What this means is
that we have a general societal agreement that the government usually
should not take account of an individual’s race in making decisions or
providing services. This view, which we might also call “race-neutral
antidiscrimination,” is perfectly captured by Chief Justice Roberts’s
admonition in Parents Involved: “The way to stop discrimination on the
basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”157 This
commitment is a huge advance beyond a de jure regime, but it is not
integration properly understood. American civil rights law and policy is
committed to individualistic race-neutrality, not the enforcement of real
integration.158 Integration, in other words, remains an unreached goal.
Peller defines integration as integrationism and then conflates
integrationism with our society’s commitment to individualistic raceneutrality.159 The better view is that integrationists recognize the
limitations of our society’s equality norm (a commitment to enforcing
race-neutral, antidiscrimination in governmental decision-making), but
press for the fullest possible enforcement of that norm notwithstanding its
inherent limitations.160 From this perspective, integrationists seek effective
and full enforcement of the antidiscrimination mandate under conditions of
155
See id. at 45 (“In our society race has been about exclusion, power and belonging. It might be
more accurate to say that is what white has meant in our society. Whiteness has been functionally
defined as the right to exclude and dominate others.”).
156
This is perhaps best exemplified by the striking success of Title II of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which prohibits racial and other types of discrimination in privately-owned public
accommodations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–g (2006).
157
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 (2007).
158
See Stefanie DeLuca, What Is the Role of Housing Policy? Considering Choice and Social
Science Evidence, 34 J. URB. AFF. 21, 23–24 (2012) (arguing that in the context of federal housing
policy, the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development does not have a mission of
enhancing housing mobility and racial integration). Integration is enforced unenthusiastically, if at all,
and in an uncoordinated and piecemeal fashion. Even in the context of school desegregation, which is
most closely associated with integration, coordinated, sustained enforcement of the desegregation
mandate by all three branches of the federal government lasted for only six years (1968–1974). See
generally Gary Orfield et al., Deepening Segregation in American Public Schools, 19 S. CHANGES 11,
13–14 (1997) (discussing the changes to school segregation policies, which are detracting from prior
integration efforts).
159
PELLER, supra note 2, at 3–5.
160
See, e.g., Gary Peller, Race Conciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 770–72 (explaining that “the
integrationist cure for discrimination is equal treatment” and how this view is highly abstract).
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equality. On this view, integrationists demand that law and policy break
up and redistribute some of whites’ “ill gotten gain” by facilitating black
individuals’ access to whites’ resources.161 From this perspective,
integrationists demand that our race-neutral, antidiscrimination regime
break down “barriers to entry”162 to formerly closed white spaces and
provide members of minority groups access to certain markets, i.e.,
education, marriage, housing, and employment, which had been restricted
under the previous de jure system.163
Peller argues that by the late 1960s, black nationalists led by Malcolm
X had developed a sophisticated approach to white supremacy that
“combined militant engagement with the white power structure with the
racial solidarity and anti-assimilationism traditionally associated with
nationalism.”164 In his view, nationalism’s potential was never reached
because of a tragic compromise:
Along with the suppression of white racism . . . the dominant
conception of racial justice was framed to require that Black
Nationalism be equated with white supremacy and that race
consciousness on the part of either whites or blacks be
marginalized as beyond the good sense of ‘enlightened’
American culture.165
Critical Race Consciousness did not convince me that black
nationalism was poised to provide either an ideological critique or a
coherent affirmative program to achieve racial equality that was superior to
the one advanced by the leaders of the Civil Rights Movement, such as
Martin Luther King, Jr., Bayard Rustin, and James Farmer, who are most
closely associated with integration.166 But even granting that black
nationalism provided a sophisticated critique of white power and
161
See Adams, supra note 34, at 275–76 (“[E]quality is defined not just as equity with respect to
facilities and resources under conditions of segregation, but as access to the structures of opportunity
associated with success and upward mobility.”).
162
In antitrust law, a barrier to entry is defined as “some factor in a market that permits firms
already in the market to earn monopoly profits, while deterring outsiders from coming in.” HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 39 (2d ed.
1999).
163
See Michelle Adams, Intergroup Rivalry, Anti-Competitive Conduct and Affirmative Action, 82
B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1117–21 (2002) (exploring racial discrimination as a “barrier to entry”).
164
PELLER, supra note 2, at 59.
165
Id. at xii.
166
Professor Peller’s revisionist attempt to separate Dr. King from integration only demonstrates
that Peller’s vision of “integrationism” is too impoverished to include him. See id. at 43–45 (“King has
become more of an ‘integrationist’ in death, however, than he was in life.”) If King was not an
integrationist, then no one was. See Randall Kennedy, Imagining Malcolm X, AM. PROSPECT (June 9,
2011), http://prospect.org/article/imagining-malcolm-x (asserting that Malcolm X did not have a
coherent program for achieving racial equality and that “during black America’s most rousing
decade . . . Malcolm X allowed himself to be largely confined to the sidelines”).
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domination, it was never going to achieve ideological dominance in a more
open society. One of the reasons that the nationalist approach failed was
because it was premised on a vision of racial solidarity that could not be
sustained once de jure segregation was prohibited. The nationalist
approach was too static to deal with the mobility that a race-neutral,
antidiscrimination regime represented and the fluidity that a multiracial
society promised.
A race-neutral, antidiscrimination regime tends to increase racial
Ironically, racial
fragmentation and undermine racial solidarity.167
fragmentation is a sign of the success of our civil rights laws. Where
access is more open we would expect to see more racial fragmentation and
less racial solidarity.168 Today, there is even more fragmentation in the
black community.169 Commentators have suggested that there are at least
two, and as many as four, discrete black “communities.”170 These
communities are not just geographically separate, but experience racism
that is “different in kind—not just in degree—from the racism that plagued
the underclass.”171 Not only do these disparate black communities
experience racial discrimination differently, their interests are often
divergent.172 Once there was a widespread commitment to race-neutral
antidiscrimination, the concept of a black “nation” was inherently unstable,
and increasingly incoherent.
167
See generally EUGENE ROBINSON, DISINTEGRATION: THE SPLINTERING OF BLACK AMERICA
(2010) (arguing that the black community has splintered into four groups as prospects have improved
for the race as a whole).
168
In 1987, William Julius Wilson famously observed that as de jure discrimination eased, many
middle and working class blacks left black neighborhoods, leaving behind a group of “truly
disadvantaged” blacks who were poorly situated to take advantage of the open access regime provided
by our civil rights laws. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY,
THE UNDERCLASS AND PUBLIC POLICY 7 (1987).
169
See ROBINSON, supra note 167, at 1–5 (arguing that to the extent there was ever one unified
black community, contemporary black America has fragmented into separate communities with
different interests and often inconsistent worldviews).
170
See id. at 5 (arguing that there are four black Americas: the mainstream middle-class majority,
a large abandoned minority, a small transcendent elite, and a newly emergent group comprised of
mixed raced individuals and recent black immigrants); Richard Thompson Ford, Barack Is the New
Black: Obama and the Promise/Threat of the Post-Civil Rights Era, 6 DU BOIS REV. 37, 47 (2009)
(examining the divide between the underclass and middle-class blacks who are “well positioned to
improve their social and economic status by moving into well-paid jobs and into better
neighborhoods”).
171
Ford, supra note 170, at 45.
172
See James Forman, Jr., The Black Poor, Black Elites, and America’s Prisons, 32 CARDOZO L.
REV. 791, 796 (2011) (arguing that in “the criminal context . . . different portions of the black
community have interests that are often in direct tension”); see also PEW RES. CTR., OPTIMISM ABOUT
BLACK PROGRESS DECLINES: BLACKS SEE GROWING VALUES GAP BETWEEN POOR AND MIDDLE
CLASS 3 (2007), available at http://pewsocialtrends.org/files/2010/10/Race-2007.pdf (“By a ratio of
two-to-one, blacks say that the values of poor and middle class blacks have grown more dissimilar over
the past decade. In contrast, most blacks say that the values of blacks and whites have grown more
alike during this same time period.”).
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B. Reassessing the Effect of Integration on Equal Protection Law
Professor Peller’s capture of integration as having footing solely in
individualistic race neutrality is also problematic because it
mischaracterizes the extent to which integration, as distinguished from an
ideology of individualistic race-neutrality, has led to current views of equal
protection laws. Critical Race Consciousness argues that “a conservative,
integrationist approach to race frames American race discrimination
doctrine.”173 For Peller, the story goes something like this: once middleclass blacks and liberal whites coalesced around the integrationist ideal as
the appropriate approach to achieving racial equality, integrationist
ideology became part and parcel of “mainstream American legal discourse
about race.”174 This was problematic because the integrationist ideology
Most
embraced colorblindness and rejected race consciousness.175
pointedly, Peller asserts that it was the integrationists’ rejection of race
consciousness that facilitated the Court’s narrow interpretation of the
Equal Protection Clause.176
In particular, Peller points to the Court’s resolution of the question of
what standard should be applied to determine a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. In Washington v. Davis,177 the Court held that a
plaintiff must establish that the government acted with discriminatory
intent or purpose in order to state a claim under the Equal Protection
Clause.178 To support this conclusion, the Court distinguished its treatment
of de jure versus de facto discrimination in the school desegregation
context.179 The Court observed that it had always required a showing of
governmental intent or purpose to segregate or discriminate, that is
discrimination by law or in order to state a claim under the Equal
Protection Clause.180 Conversely, the Court rejected evidence of de facto
segregation, segregation that could not be traced to a racially
discriminatory governmental purpose, as a sufficient evidentiary basis to
support an equal protection claim.181 Thus, the Court pointedly refused to
allow plaintiffs to establish a violation of the Equal Protection Clause
using the more relaxed disparate impact standard, i.e., evidence that a

173

PELLER, supra note 2, at xvi.
Id. at 71, 94–95.
175
Id. at 72.
176
Id. at 95.
177
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
178
Id. at 240–41.
179
Id. at 240.
180
Id.
181
See id. (“That there are both predominantly black and predominantly white schools in a
community is not alone violative of the Equal Protection Clause.”).
174
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particular government action had a racially discriminatory effect.
Peller argues that the commitment to integration in legal discourse
made it difficult for proponents of a disparate impact standard to fully
articulate the value of that standard as a constitutional norm.183 Peller
asserts that the choice between the two standards, de jure versus de facto
integration, entailed a value judgment about “the nature of the status quo of
race relations.”184 Peller also asserts that the best argument in favor of a
disparate impact or a de facto standard in the Davis case would have
required reference to race consciousness, which was an anathema to the
integrationist approach.185 Consequently:
Liberal equal protection arguments were defensive and
apologetic because the race consciousness necessary to apply
the de facto standard violated the foundational beliefs in the
rationality of colorblindness, and because the strongest
arguments for a de facto standard—the distributive justice
claims of minority communities to proportional participation
in American life—could not be articulated within the
confines of integrationist ideology.186
Peller’s argument recognizes how close the Court came to actually
adopting a de facto standard in Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver,
Colorado.187 In fact, the Court effectively did adopt a de facto standard for
enforcing violations of the Brown desegregation mandate in the South.188
Like Peller, I wish the Court had adopted the de facto approach Justice
Powell proposed in Keyes, which would have relieved plaintiffs of the
burden of establishing discriminatory intent and allowed them to
demonstrate a violation of the Equal Protection Clause “where segregated

182
Id. at 247–48. The Court approved the use of a disparate impact standard for showing
violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431
(1971).
183
PELLER, supra note 2, at 94.
184
Id. at 92.
185
See id. at 94 (“In the context of Davis, for example, the best argument against continued use of
a test that disproportionately screened out black applicants for police positions might have been the
black community’s interest in having its members serve on the armed force that would be patrolling
their neighborhoods . . . .”).
186
Id. At another point in the book, however, Peller seems to contradict this assertion by
observing that “[i]n the school context, progressives argued for a de facto test that would make
constitutional requirements turn on the actual achievement of integration, rather than merely a cessation
of intentional segregative practices on the part of the government.” Id. at 115.
187
Id. at 89.
188
See Michelle Adams, Racial Inclusion, Exclusion and Segregation in Constitutional Law, 28
CONST. COMMENT. 1, 3 (2012) (“[T]he court has evidenced far more concern about de facto
segregation . . . than many scholars and commentators recognize.”).
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public schools exist within a school district to a substantial degree.” But
it is not clear that advocating from a “race consciousness perspective”
would have guaranteed such a result, or that the price of obtaining such a
result would have been worth paying. After all, the reason why Justice
Powell does not speak for the majority in Keyes is because he failed to
attract the more liberal Justice Brennan to his position. Why? Because
Justice Brennan rejected Justice Powell’s quid pro quo agreement to reduce
or eliminate the use of busing to enforce the Brown mandate.190
Now, one might take the position that this is just further evidence of
the hegemonic influence of Peller’s version of the integrationist approach
at work. After all, Brennan refused to join Powell because he favored
busing.191 Thus, Justice Brennan, “the integrationist,” was willing to forgo
the more “race conscious” de facto interpretation of the Equal Protection
Clause in order to forcibly integrate the schools. But as discussed above,
the real integrationist approach is both structural in nature and has radical
potential. Even if we ignore all of the benefits integration has for children
of all races and for society more generally, social science research
indicates that an integrated education increases achievement outcomes for
minority youth.192 Thus, one way of understanding Justice Brennan’s
189

Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S 189, 224. While I prefer the de facto to the
de jure standard for establishing a violation of the Equal Protection Clause, I readily understand why,
as discussed below, Justice Brennan might not have adopted that approach.
190
See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND
MATERIALS 940–41 (5th ed., 2006) (explaining the “deal” between Justices Brennan and Powell in
Keyes). The proposed deal in Keyes was that:
Justice Powell, the conservative Democrat from Richmond, Virginia, offered the
liberal majority headed by Justice Brennan. . . . to eliminate the de jure/de facto
distinction, which, as a practical matter, would make it much easier to establish that
school systems were in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by operating
systems with “racially identifiable” schools . . . . In return, liberals would have to
agree to rein in the use of busing as a remedy. Justice Brennan rejected this offer,
preferring to maintain the requirement that plaintiffs must show intent to maintain a
segregated school system, buttressed by various presumptions.
Id. at 940–41; see also William Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social Movements on
Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062, 2101 n.171 (2002) (“Brennan
offered to redraft his opinion to discard the de facto-de jure distinction, but not at the cost of diluting
Swann’s approval of busing. Because he was so opposed to busing for pragmatic reasons, Powell went
his own way, and his attack on the distinction drew the support only of Justice Douglas in the end.”
(citations omitted)).
191
See BREST ET AL., supra note 190, at 941 (noting that Brennan rejected reining in the use of
busing).
192
See Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, Remarks to the Minnesota Education Commission Task Force on
Integrated Schools: What Social Science Research from the Last 20 Years Says About the Effects of
Integrated Education on Achievement Outcomes (Dec. 20, 2011), available at http://www.schooldiversity.org/pdf/Mickelson_Minnesota_testimony_12-20-11.pdf (“When compared with their
otherwise comparable peers who attend schools with high concentrations of low-income and/or
disadvantaged minority youth, students who attend diverse schools are more likely [t]o achieve higher
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approach in Keyes is not as an abstract commitment to race neutrality, but a
constitutional remedy that imploded structural barriers and substantively
benefited black children.
Similarly, Justice Powell, who advocated for a de facto approach,
would seem an odd champion of race consciousness. Perhaps one
explanation for his opinion, which accurately observed that the cause of
segregated schools in metropolitan areas throughout the United States was
residential segregation and individual migratory patterns,193 is that legal
doctrine is endlessly malleable and that a constitutional right can easily be
divorced from a constitutional remedy.194 Justice Powell’s approach would
certainly have “lowered the bar” with respect to the plaintiff’s burden of
proving a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. But then what? A
close read of Justice Powell’s opinion in Keyes indicates that the duty on
the defendant (once a violation of the Equal Protection Clause had been
established) was to operate an “integrated school system[].”195
But it is not clear that Justice Powell’s “integrated school system”
meant actual racial integration of the public schools. Instead, the duty on
the defendant under Justice Powell’s de facto regime was to “take
affirmative steps” to integrate the school system by integrating the faculties
and administration; assuring quality facilities, instruction, and curriculum
throughout the school district; drawing attendance zones to promote
integration; and making school siting, closure, and student transportation
decisions (i.e., busing) with integration in mind.196 Indeed, Justice Powell
made clear that “[a] school which happens to be all or predominantly white
or all or predominantly black is not a ‘segregated’ school in an
unconstitutional sense if the system itself is a genuinely integrated one.”197
Thus, the adoption of a de facto approach in Keyes (more relaxed standard
test scores and grades; [t]o graduate from high school; [a]nd to attend and graduate from college[.]
Attending a diverse school promotes achievement in mathematics, science, language and
reading. . . . [These] findings undermine the fiction the integration efforts fail to improve academic
achievement and that there is little value in pursuing school diversity.”).
193
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 223 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
194
See John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87, 90
(1999) (exploring the large rights-remedy gap in constitutional torts and arguing that it “fosters the
development of constitutional law”); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Shoe-Horning, Shell Games, and
Enforcing Constitutional Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 78 UMKC L. REV. 875, 877 (2010)
(asserting that “although the Court insists on individualized injury as a prerequisite for invoking
judicial intervention, the Court displays increasing indifference to providing individualized remedies
for persons subjected to an important range of unconstitutional conduct”).
195
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 236 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
196
Id. at 241.
197
Id. at 227; see also Eskridge, supra note 190, at 2100 (describing an amicus brief Justice
Powell authored as an attorney on behalf of the state of Virginia in Swann v. Charlotte Mecklenburg
Board of Education prior to his ascension to the Supreme Court, in which Powell expressed a
pragmatic view of busing and argued that the trial judge should not have required the school district to
engage in “massive busing”).
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of proof) would not necessarily have led to better or more radical outcomes
for black children.
My point here is that legal doctrine is malleable. The adoption of an
integrationist ideology in equal protection doctrine would not guarantee
actual or true integration (although it would help). Similarly, the adoption
of a race consciousness approach in interpreting constitutional law would
not necessarily have guaranteed substantive equality for black people.198
Instead, the ever-shifting meaning of the Brown decision and the trajectory
of equal protection doctrine has had more to do with the complex
interaction of social movements, electoral results, court appointments, and
white backlash than with integrationists’ ideological “capture” of racial
discourse.199
Peller’s discussion of the intent versus impact alternatives in equal
protection doctrine is not just confined to his critique of the Washington v.
Davis decision.
Critical Race Consciousness argues that the
integrationists’ rejection of race consciousness facilitated the ability of the
Supreme Court to strike down the voluntary student assignment plan at
issue in Parents Involved.200 Peller’s argument is that the debates in legal
discourse since the Brown decision took place entirely within the
integrationist ideology: “that race is an arbitrary characteristic [and that]
racial justice consists of equal treatment according to race neutral
norms.”201 The problem was that once state actors stopped explicitly
discriminating on the basis of race and obtained race neutrality, the only
“work” that race neutrality and colorblindness could do was to undermine
or otherwise thwart race conscious affirmative action plans.202 From this
perspective, the result in Parents Involved is not surprising because the
voluntary, race-conscious student assignment plan involved in the case was
198
While the quest to equalize school funding in predominantly minority schools would seem to
come closest to embodying a race consciousness approach in antidiscrimination law and policy, school
finance reform is a poor substitute for racial and socioeconomic integration. See James E. Ryan,
Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249, 256 (1999) (arguing that not only has “school finance
reform . . . done little to improve the academic performance of students in predominantly minority
districts, but also that it may be a costly distraction from the more productive policy of racial and
socioeconomic integration”).
199
See Balkin, supra note 132, at 1574 (“[T]he U.S. Supreme Court[] tend[s], over time, to reflect
the views of national political majorities and national political elites. Constitutional doctrine changes
gradually in response to political mobilizations and countermobilizations. Minority rights gain
constitutional protection as minorities become sufficiently important players in national coalitions and
can appeal to the interests, values, and self-conception of majorities, but minority rights will gain
protection only to the extent that they do not interfere too greatly with the developing interests of
majorities.”).
200
See PELLER, supra note 2, at 89 (arguing that race consciousness in school assignment plans
was explicitly rejected as a means to achieve racial integration in Parents Involved).
201
Id. at 72, 95.
202
See id. at 89–90 (arguing that Parents Involved is an example of modern “colorblindness”
working against integration).
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inconsistent with “legal liberal integrationist thinking in law.” Thus, for
Peller, the Court’s ruling in Parents Involved “completes an arc in the reinterpretation of Brown from a realist, functionalist case concerned about
the real world impact of race policies on Black students to a ‘principled’
symbol of the evils of race consciousness in general.”204
Peller underestimates the possibilities for progressive outcomes even
within the prevailing legal and ideological regime. The meaning of “equal
protection” has been and continues to be contested, and the various
opinions in Parents Involved demonstrate that fact.205 In Parents Involved,
the Court considered the meaning of equal protection. At issue in the case
was the constitutionality of two voluntary student assignment plans
adopted by two public school districts that were intended to reduce racial
concentration in the schools and “ensure that racially concentrated housing
patterns [did] not prevent nonwhite students from having access to the
most desirable schools.”206 Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority,
ruled that the two plans violated the Equal Protection Clause.207 Roughly,
there were five votes for the proposition that the two student assignment
plans violated “strict scrutiny” because they were not narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling governmental interest.208 But the Court greatly
disagreed with respect to the propriety of the school districts’ goal of
achieving racial diversity in the public schools in the first instance.209
Justice Kennedy provided the critical fifth vote for the majority
opinion striking the two plans down.210 But he also wrote at length about
the importance of racial diversity in the public schools and the need to
eradicate de facto segregation.211 Justice Kennedy described the school
districts’ compelling governmental interest in a sweepingly broad fashion,
suggesting that public school districts have a compelling interest in
“avoiding racial isolation.”212 And he provided examples of a variety of
facially neutral yet race conscious mechanisms that school districts could
use to eradicate racial isolation in the schools and achieve a diverse student

203
Id. at 94; see also id. (“While liberals acknowledge the white power structure’s dominance in
society, they take the structure in which whites have been privileged as the fixed background against
which race-conscious remedies are to be seen as exceptional. In this view, race-conscious state action
can be appropriate, but only as a remedy for conscious racial bias.”).
204
Id. at 89–90.
205
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 707 (2007).
206
Id. at 725.
207
Id. at 747.
208
Id. at 720, 726.
209
See id. at 760–761 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the dissent’s cited interest is “too
amorphous,” has “no logical stopping point,” and requires “sheer speculation”).
210
Id. at 707 (majority opinion).
211
Id. at 788–89, 793–96 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
212
Id. at 797.
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213

population.
Justice Stevens was blunt in his dissenting opinion. He
openly chastised the Chief Justice for relying on Brown to support a
decision striking down public school districts’ voluntary integration
plans.214 According to Justice Stevens, the “Chief Justice fail[ed] to note
that it was only black schoolchildren who were so ordered; indeed, the
history books do not tell stories of white children struggling to attend black
schools.”215 Justice Stevens accused Chief Justice Roberts of rewriting
history and twisting legal doctrine to support his position.216 For Justice
Stevens, Brown could only be understood from a race conscious
perspective.
Finally, Justice Breyer’s lengthy dissent hewed to traditional equal
protection interpretation and yet was explicitly race conscious in its
approach. In Justice Breyer’s reading of precedent—the same precedent
that moved the plurality to the opposite conclusion—“[a] longstanding and
unbroken line of legal authority tells us that the Equal Protection Clause
permits local school boards to use race-conscious criteria to achieve
positive race-related goals.”217 For Justice Breyer, the Equal Protection
Clause permits school districts’ voluntary race-conscious measures that
intend to eradicate racial exclusion and guarantee full citizenship for
African Americans.218 The reason, according to Justice Breyer, was
because there was a fundamental difference between racial classifications
used to include and bring the races together, and those used to exclude and
keep the races separate.219 Justice Breyer’s dissent is consistent with the
core substantive claim of integration, which is that exclusion and
segregation facilitate white supremacy and therefore must be eradicated.
That the Equal Protection Clause could be open to differing interpretations
is not inconsistent with that idea.
IV. CONCLUSION
As I suggested at the outset of this Book Review, one must give
Professor Peller credit for intervening in this important discussion about
integration. Professor Peller’s central achievement is to add value to the
scholarly discussion about a critical issue: What is the meaning of racial
justice, and did (and does) integration help us achieve it? But as I have
argued, Professor Peller paints an over-simplified, one-dimensional picture
of integration. The integrationism versus nationalism framework tends to
213

Id. at 789.
Id. at 798–99 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
215
Id. at 799.
216
Id.
217
Id. at 823 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
218
Id. at 843.
219
Id. at 829.
214
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associate the limits of race neutrality with an integrationist worldview by
encouraging binary thinking.
But the reality was always more
complicated. Not only does fealty to this account invariably produce
conflict, but it lacks the ability to provide either coherent explanations of
or adequate solutions for racial inequality in a complex and changing
world.
Along these lines, consider the debate about the “Moving to
Opportunity” petition signed by almost two hundred social scientists
urging the government to provide housing mobility assistance to
individuals displaced by Hurricane Katrina.220 The petition asserted that
“[a]s the nation seeks to find housing for the many who have been left
homeless, our goal for these low-income displaced persons, most of whom
are racial minorities, should be to create a ‘move to opportunity.’”221 The
petition cited scientific research indicating that “moving to lower poverty,
lower risk neighborhoods and school districts can have significant positive
effects on the well-being and economic opportunity of low-income
children and their families.”222 The thrust of the petition was to link
location to opportunity (or lack thereof) and to urge the government to
provide housing assistance so that persons displaced by Katrina could
relocate to lower poverty and implicitly less racially segregated
neighborhoods.223 The petitioners asserted that assisted housing mobility is
“one of the nation’s most important and under-utilized tools for closing the
gap between the haves and the have nots.”224 Thus, they advocated that
individuals displaced by Hurricane Katrina be given federal rental housing
subsidies to facilitate a “move to opportunity.”225
The Moving to Opportunity petition was controversial. In 2008, David
Imbroscio asserted that the petition was a classic example of the reigning
“Dispersal Consensus” approach to eradicating urban poverty.226 Calling
such an approach hegemonic, Imbroscio argued that the petitioners have
“coalesced around the central idea that the only way to make a serious dent
in ameliorating the plague of urban poverty—not only in New Orleans but
220
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throughout urban America—is to disperse (or deconcentrate) the urban
poor into wealthier (usually suburban) neighborhoods.”227 Imbroscio
attacked the social scientists he identified for intentionally exaggerating the
benefits of moving to opportunity while slighting “evidence suggesting the
viability of alternatives to it,”228 overestimating individuals’ desire to move
from inner cities,229 advocating “reeducation” in an attempt to persuade
individuals to leave their neighborhoods and communities, and repressing
real freedom of choice by restricting the use of housing assistance to “more
affluent and possibly predominately white neighborhoods.”230
The debate about the Moving to Opportunity petition suggests a classic
binary choice: Should we enrich or integrate? “Gild the ghetto,” or help
people move out? Under this now standard account, the debate breaks
down into another variation of the integrationism versus nationalism
conflict. But the integrationism versus black nationalism frame ultimately
detracts from the quest for racial equality; it erects a false dichotomy. As
Xavier Briggs emphasized in his response to David Imbroscio’s critique,
“[i]mproving the quality of life of the very poor and helping them escape
poverty are two very different things, but both matter.”231 Along these
lines, Briggs’s and Margery Turner’s call for “equitable redevelopment” of
New Orleans did not focus solely on housing mobility. Indeed, they
defined equitable redevelopment to include housing mobility and:
[H]ousing affordable to families at a wide range of income
levels, measurably better public transportation and other job
links, schools that are on track to succeed, healthcare access,
a smart retail mix, business linkages to the regional economy,
a viable tax base, and more mixed-income communities that
reflect how urban America can and should function.232
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To be sure, integration is often criticized and castigated. To a certain
extent this is understandable, given the scope and complexity of the
problem it attacks and the deep-seated emotional, political, and social
underpinnings of that problem. Brown v. Board of Education raised
expectations that were nearly impossible to meet.233 But that does not
mean that integration itself was a failed and bankrupt strategy from the
start. Nor does it mean that integration is not a crucial approach for
continuing the journey toward racial equality today. If Critical Race
Consciousness demonstrates anything, it is that the burden on integration is
too high. Over and over again, we have asked integrationists not just to
fight but to win the war against white supremacy. But we place no such
burden on any other strategy designed to achieve racial equality.
Integration should be understood not as a set of tactical tools for merely
changing prejudicial views, but rather as a systematic, thoughtful, and
long-term approach for undermining established racially driven power
structures. It envisions nothing less than redressing fundamental societal
power imbalances, and given the audacity of that goal, we should not
conclude it has lost the war while the battles are still raging.

that “[i]t is time to move beyond the mobility versus place debate”).
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